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Victims of Circumstance:
The Execution of German Deserters by
Surrendered German Troops Under Canadian
Control in Amsterdam, May 1945
Chris Madsen
Introduction

O

n the morning of 13 May 1945, five days
after the formal capitulation of Hitler's
Wehrmacht, a German military court delivered
death sentences on two German naval
deserters, Bruno Dorfer and Rainer Beck. The
trial occurred in an abandoned Ford assembly
plant on the outskirts of Amsterdam, a site
used by the Canadian army for the
concentration of German naval personneL Later
that same day, a German firing squad, supplied
with captured German rifles and a three-ton
truck from the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
and escorted by Canadian Captain Robert K.
Swinton, executed the two German prisoners
of war a short distance outside the enclosure. 1
Dorfer and Beck were among the last victims of
a military legal system distorted by the Nazi
state. At the time no one, Canadian or German,
questioned the justice of the event.
This tragic incident demonstrated a
disturbing degree of cooperation between
Canadian military units and the defeated
German military. Why did German deserters
like Dorfer and Beck continue to die after the
end of the war? The executions were a matter
of convenience. The Canadian military allowed
the German military structure to function after
the capitulation. Under this questionable
arrangement, the German armed forces in
Holland disarmed, concentrated, and evacuated
themselves. To accomplish this gigantic task
in an orderly and disciplined way, Canadian
military authorities mistakenly relied on the
vanquished German military leadership.

German commanders and military judges
continued to apply an irregular military law
against deserters; and Canadian restrictions
on these actions remained limited and hesitant.
In this situation, larger political and strategic
considerations worked against deserters like
Dorfer and Beck. Canadian reactions, during
and twenty-one years after the execution,
reflected a sad record of indifference and
callousness for these unfortunate victims of
latent Nazism.

Background

T

he strategic situation in North-West
Europe became quite curious at the end of
the Second World War. Canadian and British
advances into the Netherlands and Germany
effectively cut off German military forces in
Western Holland. 2 The Twenty-Fifth German
Army, under the command of Generaloberst
Johannes von Blaskowitz. retreated into a
fortified area between the Maas and Waal
Rivers in the south and the Grebbe Line in the
east. This "Festung Holland" contained
approximately 150,000 German soldiers. 3 A
composite garrison of German army and naval
formations awaited the final collapse of the
German armed forces. The German military's
threat to destroy Holland's extensive dyke
systems and flood the fertile countryside
prevented further advances of Canadian
military units. 4 Consequently, battle-lines in
the Netherlands remained relatively constant.
These conditions provided a basis for agreement
between Canadian and German military
leadership. On 28 April 1945. Lieutenant93
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The surrender of German forces in the Netherlands, I Canadian Corps HQ, 5 May 1945.
(Photo: Alex M. Stirton, NAC PA 133321)

General Charles Foulkes, commander of I
Canadian Corps, and Blaskowitz concluded a
makeshift armistice for feeding the Dutch
civilian population. Under Operation "Faust,"
Canadian truck convoys drove through German
lines, merchant ships sailed for major Dutch
ports, and Allied bombers dropped food rations. 5
In this way, the First Canadian Army, under
General Harry Crerar, began an enduring
working relationship with the German military
administration in Holland. On 5 May 1945,
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery,
commander of the 21st British Army Group,
accepted from Generaladmiral Hans Georg von
Friedeburg "the surrender of all German forces
in Holland, in northwest Germany including
the Frisian Islands, and Heligoland and all
other islands, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in
Denmark. "6 At the small town ofWageningen,

Crerar, through Foulkes, issued detailed
instructions to Blaskowitz for implementation
of this surrender in the Netherlands. The
document made the German general
responsible "for all GERMAN Armed Forces
(including German Navy, Army, Air Forces),
auxiliaries and civilians" 7 within Blaskowitz's
sphere of control. Meanwhile, the signing of
the unconditional surrender by German
plenipotentiaries at Rheims on 7 May 1945, to
take effect the next day, formally ended the
Third Reich.
By the time of the final capitulation,
Canadian military forces were not yet inside
German-occupied Holland. At 2300 hours on
7 May 1945, the Seaforth Highlanders of
Canada, a regiment of the 1st Canadian Infantry
Division, received orders to proceed forward:
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"Instead of going to HAARLEM we are now to go
to AMSTERDAM and will be the first unit to
travel into the newly liberated area. "8 During
the next few days, Canadian military units
slowly moved towards designated occupation
zones within Holland. Enthusiastic Dutch
crowds swamped Canadian columns at every
crossroad along inward routes. LieutenantColonel H.P. Bell-Irving, the commander of the
Seaforth Highlanders, described the Canadian
entry into Amsterdam:
The universal happiness amounted to an ecstasy
which I have never seen even approached in any
crowd before. Before this, few of our men could have
given a clear reason why they came ... But here in
Amsterdam, in one day, all that was changed ...
Every life lost. every long day away from home, had
been spent in a good and necessary endeavour. 9

The Dutch population greeted Canadian
soldiers as liberators; Holland was once again
a free country. The arrival of Canadian military
forces officially ended five long years of German
rule.

Nevertheless, the German military remained
a potent force within Holland. The Germans
still controlled large sections of the Dutch
administrative, communication, and
transportation infrastructures. Many Dutch
civilians "could not understand, during the
first few days, a situation where armed
Canadian soldiers were going up one side of the
road and armed Germans going down the other
side, neither interfering with the other. "10
German military formations carried on with
regular duties under the surrender agreement.
Until further Canadian instructions,
Blaskowitz's headquarters remained
"responsible for the maintenance and discipline
ofallGermantroopsinWESTERNHOLLAND." 11
At times, the vengeful activities of Nederlandse
Binnenlandse Strydkrachten (NBS), or Dutch
Interior Forces, impinged on this practical
arrangement. The Canadians found "a country
whose friendly people and resistance forces are
lusting to see the last of the Germans." 12
Anything German became a target; the NBS

Disarmed German soldiers move towards concentration areas.
(Piwto: Alex M. Stirton/NAC PA 151928)
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declared open season on German soldiers found
alone on Amsterdam streets. Thus, the
Germans gained safety in numbers, and
retained weapons for protection: "There was
some trouble in the "D" Company sector of the
town-some Dutch got into a boat and
attempted to shoot up a German concentration
area. The fire was returned by the Germans. " 13
Sporadic outbursts of violence erupted between
the two heavily armed groups. The German
military structure therefore represented an
element of order in a potentially explosive and
chaotic situation.

Concentration
major priority of Canadian military units
in Amsterdam was the disarming and
concentration of German military personnel.
On 11 May 1945, "D" Company of the Seaforth
Highlanders "moved from the MONTESSORI
School, MRE041205 to the Ford Factory at
MRE013286 to control the concentration of
German Marines." 14 The Canadian company
established an administrative headquarters at
this large abandoned factory across from the
town ofZaandam. The location was well suited
for gathering extensive German naval forces in
the area. However, Field Marshal Montgomery,
in his memoirs, articulated the dilemma
confronting many Canadian and British soldiers
under his command: "I was a soldier and I had
not been trained to handle anything of this
nature." 15 Canadian combat units, who had
fought and killed German soldiers on
battlefields only a week previously, now fulfilled
a very different role. Men of the Seaforth
Highlanders, veterans of the Italian campaign
and the drive into the Netherlands, embarked
on temporary wartime careers as prison camp
wardens. 16 The work was tedious and
exceedingly unpopular. A Canadian officer
commented on the enormity of the task: "Here
they were, one Canadian battalion set down in
the midst ofthousands of Germans whom they
had to locate, guard, escort, and disarm." 17
Initially, the sheer scale of surrender appeared
overwhelming. Canadian military units,
handicapped by limited occupation experience
and finite resources, coped with a complicated
situation.

A

However, the cooperation and organization
of the German military greatly aided Canadian
efforts. For the most part, German military
formations remained intact and functional. At
Julianadorp, the Germans "marched in fully
armed, wheeled into the airfield along one road
and halted." 18 Canadian soldiers merely
collected and stacked German weapons.
German war material was sorted, stored, and
guarded, pending final destruction or
distribution to Allied military and civil sources. 19
In many instances, German military formations
disarmed themselves, and moved unescorted
towards selected Canadian prison camps and
concentration areas. Canadian military units
and the NBS secured ammunition dumps and
munitions storage areas left behind by German
military forces inAmsterdam. 20 Thus, German
assistance became indispensable in disarming
and concentrating German troops. Canadian
military authorities directly benefitted from
the continuation of German military structures.
An unprecedented Allied alteration in the
application of international law allowed this
peculiar state of affairs. The Canadian military
held surrendered German soldiers, not as
prisoners of war, but as capitulated troops
under the designation "Surrendered Enemy
Personnel [SEP]":
in view of the very large numbers of GERMAN troops
now surrendering ARMY COMMANDS are authorized
to place such troops in the status of "Disarmed
GERMAN Forces" as contemplated by paragraph
2"C" and other pertinent paragraphs of ECLIPSE
memorandum No 1 7. Under provisions ofthe foregoing
memorandum these GERMAN forces will NOT be
characterized as "PRISONERS OF WAR". After
disarmament these surrendered German units may
be kept organizationally intact and to the extent
deemed advisable and practicable by ALLIED
COMMANDERS required to administer and maintain
themselves. 21

The First Canadian Army implemented
Operation "Eclipse," a pre-arranged plan for
the occupation of Germany and demobilization
ofthe German armed forces. The scheme made
the vanquished German military completely
self-sufficient and reliant on existing German
food stocks. 22 Thus, theWestemAllieswithheld
prisoner of war status because the enormous
number of surrendered German soldiers
exceeded Allied food and manpower resources.

96
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/8

4

Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur

Despite these practical justifications, the
SEP classification possessed a very doubtful
existence under international law. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe, informed Canadian
officials that "there should be no, repeat no,
public declaration regarding status of German
armed forces or of disarmed troops." 23 As
Eisenhower knew, the SEP label stretched the
bounds of international law pertaining to
prisoners of war. Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva

from all or any of the personnel of the German
armed forces the status of Prisoners ofWar." 26
Such arbitrary power on the part of a detaining
power contradicted the entire humanitarian
spirit and purpose behind the 1929 Geneva
Convention. Moreover, the Allied claim that a
legitimate German government no longer
existed seemed equally tenuous. The Allies
dissolved the acting government of
Grossadmiral Karl D6nitz on 23 May 1945. 27
Germany, as a signatory to the 1929 Geneva

Gennan and Canadian sentries guard the entrance to the .ijmuiden Concentration area.
(NAC PA 134396)

Convention clearly conferred prisoner of war
status on "all persons belonging to the armed
forces of belligerent parties, captured by the
enemy in the course of military operations." 24
Hence, the Allied distinction between the words
"captured" and "surrendered" in application of
the convention represented a very weak legal
argument. Protection under the 1929 Geneva
Convention was not limitable. 25 In the eyes of
international law, surrendered German troops
were prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the First
Canadian Army in Holland maintained
"unfettered discretion to impose on or withhold

Convention, still benefitted from the dictates of
international law until at least this later date.
Thus, Canadian military authorities assigned
a questionab 2le legal status to surrendered
German troops in Holland.
Nonetheless, the arrangement between the
Canadian army and the German armed forces
worked exceedingly well. For the most part,
the Canadians operated directly through the
existing German military hierarchy. The First
Canadian Corps established a control section
within the compound of the Twenty-Fifth
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German Army Headquarters "to act as the filter
through which the German Army Commander
passes his orders to his subordinate
formations." 28 The efficient staff work of the
Germans impressed many Canadian observers.
Additionally, Canadian military authorities left
the German military in control of their own
signals and communication network. 29 Direct
telephone links kept various Canadian and
German headquarters informed. The telephone
allowed the quick and easy passage of orders;
if needed, written orders were translated into
both English and German. Periodically, the
Canadians reminded the German military who
was in charge:
GO 500 Restricted. From Lt. General Foulkes for
Colonel-General Blaskowitz. Colonel-General
BLASKOWITZ will not repeat not visit formation
Headquarters or units of German army, air force or
navy without permission of the General officer
commanding 1 Canadian Corps. The request of
Colonel-General Blaskowitz to visit formations 11
May is NOT repeat NOT granted all information. 30

Despite minor restrictions and limitations,
the German military retained an amazing degree
of authority for a defeated army. Each
concentration area or camp possessed a
German commander in contact with higher
German authorities. At the factory occupied
by the Seaforth Highlanders, Fregattenkapitan
Alexander Stein, the German harbour
commander in Amsterdam, managed
incarcerated naval personnel. 31 A parallel
German leadership existed beside the Canadian
military hierarchy. German troops in Holland
maintained, with Canadian approval, allegiance
to the larger German armed forces.
Canadian military units, however,
frequently encountered a different kind of
German soldier. Concentration sweeps
discovered a growing number of deserters from
the German armed forces. Sometime in the
past, these men had rejected German uniforms
and the cause oftheThird Reich. The Western
Allies were partly responsible for the German
desertion problem. During the course of the
war, a Psychological Warfare Division within
SHAEF had actively sought the disintegration
and collapse of the German armed forces. 32
Special Allied propaganda teams undermined
Wehrmacht morale through various means of

persuasion. A propaganda leaflet, dropped
behind German lines by Allied planes in late
1944 and early 1945, bore the clever caption:
"Attacked from the front. Cut off from behind.
Written off by Hitler. "33 Canada, Great Britain,
and the United States promised safe conduct
and good treatment to any potential German
deserters. These Allied appeals openly incited
desertion.
Nevertheless, the number of desertions
from the German armed forces, although on a
steady increase until the end of the war,
remained relatively modest. For February
1944, the last month of accurate German
military legal records, the German military
tried only 2,098 German soldiers or
approximately 19.6 soldiers per 100,000 men
for desertion in the entire German armed
forces. 34 Statistics reveal that German military
institutions retained a cohesive character. Most
German deserters left their units for a mixture
of social and personal reasons. 35
Paradoxically, the Canadian army, which
had promoted disintegration during the war,
now took a dimmer view towards German
deserters. The act of desertion suffered from a
double-standard; armies actively sought
desertion in enemy armed forces, but frowned
upon desertion among troops under their own
control. 36 Disciplined German military units
now played an integral part in Canadian
concentration and occupation activities within
Holland. Thus, deserters threatened helpful
and necessary cohesion.
On 12 May 1945, an NBS detachment
issued a typed receipt for the transfer of six
German deserters to Canadian military
authorities. 37 Dutch administrators, militia
forces, and police often found German deserters
hiding within the large city of Amsterdam.
However, a war diary entry from 1st Canadian
Infantry Division disclosed the ultimate fate of
these men and other deserters:
With the sanction of our Headquarters the Germans
shot a half dozen of their deserters who had been
tried by German Court Martial. 2 Canadian Infantry
Brigade reported that NBS have picked up 12 more
German deserters in the jails of Rotterdam. They
were turned over to German Commander in the
concentration area at Ijmuiden. 38
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BmnoDorjer
(Der Spiegel)

Canadian military authorities, although
clearly able to assign or withhold prisoner of
war status for any German soldier, chose an
easier course. Canadian military units
repatriated deserters back to the German
military. Punishment for repudiation of German
military discipline awaited many unfortunate
men. 39 Desertion remained a concern for
German commanders; Canadian military
authorities adopted a strict policy of noninterference in German affairs. This pattern
decided the final destiny of Bruno Dorfer and
Rainer Beck.

had left the Ninth Mine-Sweeping Flotilla during
the last days of the war. 40 Beck perhaps
maintained the strongest reasons for rejecting
German military institutions. From Hitler's
ascendency to power in 1933, the Nazi regime
had persecuted his family. The reasons were
obvious: Beck's mother was Jewish, and his
father, Max Emil Beck, a decorated World War
I veteran, was compromised by a position as
Social Democratic police president of Gleiwitz
during the Weimar RepublicY When Beck was
drafted into the Kriegsmarine in 1940, he
already possessed an overt hostility and
contempt for the National Socialist state. Upon
meeting his fugitive sister in 1941, the young
man despondently declared: "If I wear the
German uniform I am a bastard. Ifl don't wear
it, I am a bastard just the same." 42 Strong antiNazi views dictated Beck's eventual departure
from the German armed forces. The arrival of
Canadian soldiers in Amsterdam seemingly
promised a new beginning from a dreadful
past. Beck and Dorfer, wearing civilian clothes,
sought out nearby Canadian military units.
However, the pair met an unexpected
reception. On 12 May 1945, the Dutch
underground brought Dorfer and Beck to the
Seaforth Highlanders' detention camp. Major
Oliver Mace, acting commanding officer of the

Trial
wenty-year old Dorfer and twenty-eightyear old Beck felt deceptively safe after the
final German surrender. The welcome news
ended long periods of concealment and fears of
discovery.
On 5 September 1944,
Maschinenmaat Beck had deserted from a
harbour defence unit at Ijmuiden, and entered
into hiding with his sister, Fredegund, in
Amsterdam; similarly, Funk-Gefreiter Dorfer,
sheltered by an aunt, Johanna Timmermanns,

T

Rainer Beck
(Der Spiegel)
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Canadian regiment, ordered Major J. Dennis
Pierce, the company commander in charge of
the former factory, to place the two deserters
inside the compound because "they were
certainly Germans and we had no other place
to put them." 43 Initially, Stein and the internal
German military leadership refused acceptance
of Dorfer and Beck. The Germans argued that
the camp was no place for deserters and traitors.
Pierce, after an argument with the German
interpreter, a Kapitdnleutnant and former Eboat officer named Hoslinger, "finally put the
two youngsters in the office of the plant manager
under guard of a German non-commissioned
officer. "44 Canadian soldiers fed Dorfer and
Beck, and periodically checked on the pair's
safety during the night. Pierce's decision
apparently offered a compromise solution to
the impasse.
In the morning, Fregattenkapitdn Stein
proposed a very different settlement. At 1005
hours on 13 May 1945, Pierce informed 2
Canadian Infantry Brigade of the intended
German course of action: "German Marine
deserters being tried this morning. German
Commander intends [to] shoot them." 45 The
German camp leadership established a
Standgericht or a court martial within the
camp. This judicial body would determine
guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, as mentioned
in the above message, Pierce and the Canadian
camp staff believed that Stein had already
decided on a verdict before the trial began.
Consequently, the court martial adopted a
mixture of exhibition and formality. The
German camp leadership brought Dorfer and
Beck before three officers, a team of military
lawyers "whom Pierce himself had "put in the
bag" in the streets of Amsterdam earlier in the
week." 46 Stein regarded the proceedings as a
show trial for his authority. At the insistence
of the German naval commander, the entire
camp population witnessed the event. A parade
state, taken earlier that morning, counted 1,817
German marines inside the camp. 47 The two
accused, represented by a German military
lawyer, underwent rigorous cross-examination
before this large staring crowd. Marineoberstabsrichters der Reserve Wilhelm Kahn, a
presiding judge, questioned first Dorfer, and

then Beck, on conditions of service, on
circumstances and events behind the
desertions, and about any resistance activities
since the initial offenses. Oberleutnantlnginieur
Frank Trmal, a young German officer present
at the fifteen-minute trial, remembered Beck's
defence:
For some reason Beck. who was older decided to
defend himself and told the court that we (the
Germans) all knew several weeks ago the war was all
over for us and that it was a matter of time before we
surrendered. He told the captain and the court that
any further fighting by us against the Canadians
would be senseless bloodshed. With this the captain
jumped to his feet in a rage, screaming at Beck that
he was calling all of us, his comrades, and his
officers, murderers. It is something that I will never
forget. 48

Any hopes of restraint and moderation
faded as the mood of the court turned uglier.
The defence lawyer's final plea of leniency fell
on deaf ears. After a short discussion, the
three military judges delivered death sentences
on Dorfer and Beck.
The operation and outcome of this court
martial was consistent with the development
of German military law during the National
Socialist years and the Second World War. The
trial represented a "kangaroo court" only in the
context that the entire German military legal
system had evolved into a tyrannical
instrument. 49 According to German historian
Manfred Messerschmidt, German military
judges, convinced by"stab in the back" illusions
from World War I and influenced by Nazi
ideology, turned away from accepted liberal
concepts of law and justice. The idea of a
Volksgemeinschcift, a unity of the German
people under the Nazi state, increasingly took
precedence over notions of personal guilt and
individual responsibility. 50 As a result, German
military law elevated offenses, previously
considered infractions against military
discipline, to the status of political crimes.
Desertion and the unique charge of
Wehrkrciftzersetzung (attempting to subvert
the will of the people to fight) became two major
offenses in the Wehrmacht. 51 German military
judges, mimicking the FUhrer, stressed
solidarity, fighting effectiveness, morale, and
the common good of the German people.
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German soldiers guarding food dump established to feed the Dutch population.
(Photo by Alex M. Stirton. NAC PA 134415)

The application of German military law
against cases of desertion reflected this
emphasis. The Militdrstrajgesetzbuch (MStGB),
a revised military criminal code introduced on
10 October 1940, established stronger
punishments for desertion:
§ 70

Punishment for Desertion
1.

The punishment for desertion is imprisonment
not less than six months.

2.

3.

If the offence is committed in the field or in an
especially difficult case, the death penalty or lifetime
imprisonment in a penitentiary is to be imposed.
If the offender continues his military service within
four weeks - in the field within one week - after the
fact, imprisonment under article 1 can be imposed:
in the case of article 2, imprisonment not less than
six months is to be imposed. 5 2

These articles allowed harsher penalties, and
gave capital punishment more consideration.
The Kriegssonderstrafrechts-verordnung
(KSSVO). a special code of procedure in force
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during the war, further reinforced the latter.
The greatest change, however, came with
interpretation ofthe new regulations. German
military judges, at the behest of superiors,
consistently chose maximum penalties in
decisions on desertion. During the last months
of the war, most convictions for desertion and
related offenses resulted in death sentences. 5 3
Death, viewed by the German military as a
deterrent, clearly became the norm for desertion
in the dying gasps of the Third Reich.
This trend was even more pronounced in
the conduct of different service branches.
Kriegsmarine judges and commanders
enthusiastically surpassed Luftwaffe and Heer
counterparts in distributing death sentences.
On27 Aprill943, D6nitz, thenewcommanderin-chief of the Kriegsmarine, had forsworn any

pardons or remissions for naval desertion
convictions, a policy previously endorsed by
his predecessor, Gross admiral Erich Raeder. 54
The German navy, perhaps the closest of the
three armed services to the Nazi state, thereby
demonstrated an institutional inclination
towards enforcement of death penalties.
Lenient verdicts were the exception in German
naval courts. Seen in this perspective, the
Dorfer and Beck judgement was almost
inevitable. German military courts, based in a
perversion of military law and legal practice,
would certainly deliver death sentences on
deserters if given the opportunity.
An indifferent and perhaps naive Canadian
military provided the opportunities. Formal
German military tribunals were unthinkable
without Canadian sanction. The war was over,

Stacked German rifles.
(Photo: Alex M. Stirton/NAC PA 151196}
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Nazi Germany was defeated, and the Canadians
occupied Holland. Why then did German
military courts exist and function after
Germany's surrender? International law clearly
prohibited these judicial proceedings. Article
44 of the 1929 Geneva Convention made
prisoners of war "subject to the laws,
regulations, and orders in force in the armies
of the detaining Power. "55 Under this provision,
German prisoners of war were no longer
accountable to German military law, but rather
responsible to Canadian military law. The field
court martial of the Canadian army, comprised
of not fewer than three officers, paralleled
German courts in structure and organization. 56
However, Canadian courts were very different
in approach. Canadian military law remained
firmly entrenched in inherited English
constitutional suppositions:
At the outset of their deliberations the court must
remember that it is the principle of English law that
the accused is presumed to be innocent until he is
proved to be guilty, and that the burden of proof rests
upon the prosecution. Unless, therefore. the guilt of
the accused has been established beyond reasonable
doubt, the accused must be acquitted. 57

In this regard, soldiers retained the rights
and responsibilities of citizens. Moreover, the
Canadian armed forces treated military
offenses, with the exception of murder, as
matters of discipline. Under Canadian military
law, punishment for desertion usually
comprised three-ten years imprisonment; the
British and Canadian governments chose to
abandon most military death penalties a decade
before the outbreak of the Second World War. 58
Thus, the survival of German deserters hinged
on the will of the Canadian military leadership
to apply accepted Canadian military law.
Foulkes, claiming ignorance of German military
courts in Holland at the time, later quipped: "I
personally was much more concerned then
with the safety of Canadian soldiers and the
welfare of Dutch civilians than with Germans. "59
The determination was simply not there.
The Canadian military belatedly attempted
a remedy of the situation through legal means.
On 15May 1945, 1stCanadianinfantryDivision
informed 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade that
"detailed instructions on discipline NOT yet

received from 21 Army Group but understood
to be enroute." 60 Throughout this time,
Canadian military units operated without clear
guidance or instruction from above on the
matter of German military courts. Finally, on
17 May 1945, the headquarters of the First
Canadian Army issued Allied Military Standing
Order No. 153 and a revised Twenty-FirstArmy
Group Administrative Instruction No. 97. 61
The two directives established comprehensive
guidelines for the maintenance of discipline
and application of justice among surrendered
German troops. Although steps in the right
direction, both documents contained
limitations.
German field courts still
maintained "internal discipline within their
own forces under the supervision and control
of the Allied Military Authorities." 62 Thus,
Order No. 153 and Instruction No. 97 did not
suspend German military courts, but rather
placed restrictions on these proceedings.
Henceforth, German military judges and
commanders required written permission from
Canadian corps district commanders for any
sentence over two years imprisonment.
Additionally, German military courts possessed
no jurisdiction, except with special
authorization from the Canadian military
government, "in respect of offences [sic] against
the [German] Military Criminal Code committed
in the course of military operations. "63 The
Canadian military, interested in occupation
and control, instead emphasized offenses
committed after the German capitulation.
Under article 27 of Instruction No. 97, the
death penalty remained in place: "Sentences
of death will be referred, through Military
Government channels, to HQ 21 Army Group,
for confirmation." 64 In the Canadian view,
German military courts and military law still
served useful purposes. The two Allied edicts,
however restricted in scope, proved too late for
Dorfer and Beck.

Execution
he final outcome of the factory court martial
highlighted the vacuum of Canadian
decision-making. Stein, upon the military
court's closing verdict, immediately appealed
to the Seaforth Highlanders for means to carry

T
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Operation "Eclipse" in Action- Gennan troops march back to Gennany.
(Photo: Alex M. Stirton/NAC PA 134287)

out the prescribed death sentences. A
flabbergasted Pierce telephoned higher
authorities for direction. At 1030 hours on 13
May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade
forwarded information to 1st Canadian Infantry
Division:
German marines in Amsterdam have picked up some
of their own deserters. They have been tried by
military law and sentenced to be shot. May they do
this. Passed to XXX Corps. Chief of Staff German
Corps will make decision - passed to 2 Canadian
Infantry Brigade. 65

The question travelled no farther up the
Canadian military hierarchy. Major-General
Harry W. Foster, commanding officer of 1st
Canadian Infantry Division, or a member of his
staff declined responsibility for the entire
affair. 66 Incredibly, Blaskowitz decided the

eventual fate of Dorfer and Beck from his
German headquarters. At 1315 hours, the
XXX German Army Corps responded directly
to 1st Canadian Infantry Division:
Reference message about German MARINE deserters
to be shot. We thank-you for advising us and Chief
of Staff approves the sentence. We shall advise our
Commander in Amsterdam accordingly. 2 [Canadian
Infantry] Brigade Information. 67

The German military, encouraged by Canadian
apathy, seized a chance to exercise its rapidly
declining authority. After advising the
Canadians, the German staff informed Stein of
Blaskowitz's approval through the German
communication network.
The process
demonstrated the smooth cooperation
established between Germans and Canadians
in Holland.
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The actual execution of Dorfer and Beck
followed a similar pattern. At 1335 hours on 13
May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade advised
Mace and Pierce of the German decision by
telephone: "German deserters will be shot,
approved by German Chief of Staff. Have FSS
personnel showed up yet? Answer: No." 68 A
written order from brigade headquarters later
confirmed this verbal directive. The Germans
and Canadians wanted the execution performed
the same day of the trial although article 66 of
the 1929 Geneva Convention insisted that all
death sentences "shall not be executed before
the expiration of a period of at least three
months" 9 after communication to the protecting
Power. Pierce, ignorant of international law
and blindly following faulty superior orders,
arranged truck transport, and issued, from a

locked room, eight German rifles with sixteen
rounds of ammunition for the German firing
squad. In these actions, the Canadian officer
disregarded the moral imperative of
disobedience. 70 Distribution of weapons
bestowed informal Canadian permission for
the execution. German officers, detailed by
Stein, would choose the execution spot, and
implement the death sentences. Fearful of
trouble with the NBS, Pierce sent Swinton, his
second-in-command, and a Sergeant-Major
named Webster "to make sure that the Germans
got back safely." 71 At 1740 hours, the German
firing squad shot Dorfer and Beck on the wall
of an air raid shelter near the factory. When
Pierce asked how the Germans could kill these
two men on a beautiful day after the end of the
war, Hoslinger replied: 'These boys have been

(Photo: Atex M. Stirton/NAC PA 183227)
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deserters, and if they were allowed to go home
and have children the minds of the children
would be dirty, too." 72 Despite defeat, codes of
loyalty and honour persisted in the German
military. Canadian officer and German officer
stubbornly clung to common standards of
military discipline.
As stated previously, the execution ofDorfer
and Beck was far from an exception. Later on
13 May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade
asked 1st Canadian Infantry Division for
instructions on more German deserters:
NBS have 12 more deserters found in jails in
Rotterdam. What does German Chief of Staff want
done with them. Are they to be shot as were others
this morning. ANSWER: put in concentration camp
Ijmuiden and turn over to camp commander General
Huttner. 73

The Canadians promptly repatriated these men
to the German military. This action brought
almost certain death. Lieutenant-Colonel A.
Powis, the commander of a temporary Canadian
occupation formation, revealed the end for
some deserters: "A German sea commander
came down to ask for ten rifles. He had some
men he wanted to shoot. (The rifles were
supplied [to] him.)" 74 Unquestioning Canadian
officers repeatedly acquiesced to German
demands. Order and discipline overrode claims
to justice.
Nevertheless, general Canadian policy
towards German deserters soon changed. On
18 May 1945, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade
reported "a Russian deserter from the German
Army who had then apparently joined the NBS
... whom they were loathe to give up to the
Germans." 75 Canadian units increasingly
questioned repatriation of deserters who had
clearly worked actively for the Allied cause in
conjunction with resistance forces. In the view
of many Canadian soldiers, surrender of these
men to a loathsome German military
establishment hardly seemed fair. The late
implementation of Standing Order No. 153 and
Instruction No. 97 salved many Canadian
consciences. Eventually, the Canadian military
followed a graduated policy towards deserters:

All the Germans who deserted after the armistice,
were turned over to their respective units for
disciplining. Germans who deserted some time ago,
but were picked up after the armistice, were sent to
the Corps PW Cage and passed back through the
usual channels. A German who had deserted many
months ago, who had got into civilian clothes and
had done good work for the Dutch Underground
must still be treated as a PW. 76

Canadian military authorities, liberally granting
prisoner of war status, assessed German
deserters in terms of situation and usefulness
to the Allies. The German military now received
only a select number of deserters. On 22 May
1945, the Seaforth Highlanders, the same
regiment which had participated in the
execution of Dorfer and Beck, showed a much
more humane and realistic approach:
During the morning, the NBS brought in another
German deserter in civilian clothes and he was sent
down to FSS to be dealt with through their channels.
Nearly every day now for the last week we had been
receiving and dispatching German deserters picked
up in civilian clothes. 77

Thus, time and attitudes worked against Dorfer
and Beck; ironically, only a few days later, the
Seaforth Highlanders regularly spared
deserters. The ongoing departure of the
Germans partly accounted for this change.
Under the timetable of Operation "Eclipse,"
the evacuation of the German armed forces
began in the latter half of May. At 0830 hours
on 15 May 1945, "D" Company of the Seaforth
Highlanders "started the movement ofthe 1800
odd Marines from their camp to IJMUIDEN." 78
This local movement was preparatory for an
even larger movement of the German armed
forces from the Netherlands. On 19 May 1945,
Blaskowitz, at the request ofFoulkes, submitted
a detailed order of march for this purpose
which concluded with an admonition for all
German troops: "I expect every man to set up
a model of discipline on the march and strictly
demand to keep roads and transit camps
ruthlessly clean." 79 Under the direction of
Blaskowitz, the German military completely
planned the march of German military
formations out ofWestern Holland. Canadian
military authorities, fulfilling the role of
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overseer, merely rubber-stamped German
proposals. 80 Not surprisingly, the tremendous
German effort proved a model of efficiency and
organization. The Germans moved "in five
large groups from the five concentration areas,
mainly by land and on foot up to DEN HELDER
Z0089 from thence by LCTs, barges, etc, across
the ZUIDER ZEE to 2 Canadian corps area. "81
Advance parties prepared transit camps for
large staggered marching groups. At the same
time, Canadian military authorities approved
retention of a four-man court martial for a
German pioneer brigade kept in the
Netherlands. 82 This court continued to apply
German military law, albeit limited by Canadian
restrictions, among remaining German troops.
Thus, the maintained German military
structure and the unusual courts martial
contributed to the larger goal of evacuation.
The Canadians wanted the Germans out of the
Netherlands as quickly as possible.
In this sense, Dorfer and Beck were
expendable pawns for larger political and
strategic concerns. Canadian and British
military authorities intended "to place all
capitulated troops in 2 Canadian Corps area
... NORTHoftheJADE-EMScanalwhichruns
between WILHELMSHAVEN and EMDEN.
Commencing 25 May, all capitulated troops in
Holland will be moved into this area. "83
In this coastal region of North-West
Germany, Blaskowitz's formations joined
recently arrived German troops from Denmark
and Norway. Why were the Canadians and
British so anxious to collect surrendered
German troops in this area? The answer was
largely twofold. Firstly, Allied victory over Nazi
Germany produced rising Canadian public
pressure to bring the boys home. Canadian
political and military leaders desired a speedy
withdrawal of the First Canadian Army from
Europe. Already at the end of May, small drafts
from the Seaforth Highlanders began leaving
for England, and then Canada. 84 Larger groups
followed in the coming months. At the same
time, Canadian troops increasingly wore out
their welcome in the Netherlands. Some Dutch
people looked forward to a time "when the
Canadians have disappeared back to Canada. "85
A friendly liberation army still constituted an
occupation army which prevented a return to

normal everyday lives. Thus, the rapid removal
of German troops remained a necessary
precursor for an equally rapid departure of the
Canadian army.
Secondly, key British figures maintained
secret plans for the enormous number of
German prisoners of war. On 1 December
1954, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
clarified, in the British House of Commons, the
situation at the end of the war: "No trouble
could in any case have arisen with the Soviets
unless they had continued their advance to a
point at which they forced the breaking out of
a new war between Russia and her Western
allies ... we should certainly in that case rearm
the German prisoners in our hands." 86
Churchill and other important officials in the
British govemment remained distrustful of
Soviet intentions; again and again, the Russians
appeared to disregard the terms of the Yalta
Agreement. Thus, in Churchill's view,
surrendered German troops, kept in existing
German military formations, represented a
safe card for the British position. In the event
of new hostilities, vanquished German units
and British military forces would have combined
against an offensive RedArmy. 87 Thus, the two
and half million German prisoners of war in
Commonwealth hands represented a huge
strategic reserve. Montgomery, directed by
Churchill, gave "a "stand still" order regarding
the destruction of German weapons and
equipment, in case they might be needed by
the Western Allies for any reason. "88 Canadian
military formations, under the strategic
command of Montgomery, shared in these
arrangements. On 4 June 1945, the First
Canadian Army directed Blaskowitz to
reorganize and consolidate units within the
Twenty-Fifth German Army. 89 Nevertheless,
as fears of a Russian advance receded and the
Western Allies settled with Stalin at Potsdam
in July 1945, the days of the maintained
German military were numbered. Beginning
in 1946, the Control Commission for Germany,
British Element (CCG, BE) gradually
demobilized the German armed forces in the
British occupation zone. 90 German soldiers
returned to shattered homes and broken
dreams in post-war Germany. However, two
sailors, buried in shallow graves on the outskirts
of Amsterdam, never returned home.
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Postscript
he aftermath of the Dorfer /Beck execution
persisted beyond 1945. During 1948-49,
the Western Allies combined their three
occupation zones into the Federal Republic of
West Germany. 91 The new country adopted a
constitutional government based on democratic
forms.
Understandably, West German
governments distanced themselves from the
Nazi past. Yet, anamazingamountofcontinuity
existed between the new Bundesrepublik and
the Third Reich.
Embarrassing public
disclosures periodically plagued politicians,
judges, civil servants, military officers and
other public figures of successive West German
governments. 92 The West German press,
reflecting contemporary German public
opinion, zealously revealed former connections
and involvement with the National Socialist
regime.

T

In this way, the wartime execution ofDorfer
and Beck became an object of public and legal
controversy in West Germany.
On 12
September 1966, the investigative Hamburg
magazine Der Spiegel broke the story based on
several interviews and cursory research. 93
Relatives of Dorfer and Beck finally discovered
the cruel fate of their missing brethren. A short
time later, Beck's surviving sister, Berthilde,
launched a civil suit against Kahn, now a
supreme court judge in Cologne, for the murder
of her brother; Kahn, in his defence, blamed
unnamed Canadian military officers for the
execution. 94 The case, eventually unsuccessful
for lack of witnesses, had months before
attracted the notice ofthe European press and
government officials. Richard Bower, the
Canadian ambassador in Bonn, dismissed the
entire controversy as a "tempest in a teacup." 95
Bower's cheeky comment, later retracted,
reflected a poor beginning on the Canadian
side.
The response of the Canadian government
on the other side of the Atlantic was equally
disappointing. On 23 September 1966, Edward
McWhinney, then director ofMcGill University's
Institute of Air and Space Law in contact with

Professor Ernst Friesenhahan in Heidelberg,
brought the Dorfer /Beck execution to the
attention of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National
Defence in the Lester Pearson government. 96
The timing was important for Hellyer; the
besieged minister was receiving considerable
criticism over a recent scrapping of nine
Canadian warships and Liberal plans for a
unification of the Canadian military. The
Conservative opposition, led by John
Diefenbaker, quickly seized upon the Dorfer j
Beck controversy as a chip in this larger political
game. On 7 October 1966, Hellyer, in an
explanatory speech to the House of Commons,
concluded that "allegations contained in Der
Spiegel are completely without foundation. "97
However, Hellyer's assurances remained shortlived.
Canadian newspapers, after interviews with
former Canadian officers and other witnesses,
presented strong evidence of active Canadian
participation in the execution. Consequently,
Brigadier William J. Lawson, then Judge
Advocate General, appointed Group Captain
J.H. Hollies to undertake a full departmental
investigation. 98 This military legal officer
searched relevant Canadian documents, and
made a three-day whirlwind trip to West
Germany. Based on Hollies' findings, an
embarrassed Hellyer confirmed, in the House
of Commons on 21 December 1966, Canadian
involvement in the execution, but suggested
"that in view of the fact it is now over 20 years
since the war ended, nothing is to be gained by
carrying this matter further. "99 With this final
statement, Canadian officials closed the public
file on Dorfer and Beck. Legal recommendations
that the Canadian government accept at least
partial responsibility for the execution and
furnish all possible aid to West German
prosecution efforts remained unfulfilled. In a
letter to McWhinney on 21 December 1966,
Hellyer dismissed the notion "that I or any
member of the [Canadian] Government may,
with propriety, suggest to another state what
legal action it should take where no offence is
alleged to have been committed against a
Canadian national. "100 After several months of
debate, the contentious execution fell from the
public eye.
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Conclusion

film. DHist 81/669, Documents released to the
author under the Canadian Access to Information
Act. 2. W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous,

T

he execution of Bruno Dorfer and Rainer
Beck by surrendered German troops in
Canadian custody was a product of many
factors. Under a dubious interpretation of
intemationallaw, Canadian military authorities
permitted a continuation of the German military
structure after the demise of the Third Reich.
German assistance was indispensable in the
disarmament, concentration, and evacuation
of the German armed forces within Holland.
Unfortunately, disinterested Canadian military
authorities also left the German military in
control of order and discipline. German
commanders and military judges applied a
military law warped by National Socialism.
The Canadian military, distracted by larger
political and strategic concerns, tardily
instituted restrictions on these proceedings.
Dorfer and Beck, seeking safety and friends,
instead found indifference and enemies. Were
the deaths ofDorfer and Beck avoidable? Yes!
Indeed, it is hard to understand why Canadian
military authorities did not follow, from their
first arrival in Amsterdam, the graduated policy
eventually adopted towards German deserters.
In the case ofDorfer and Beck, only one strong
voice along the Canadian or German military
hierarchies was needed to question the irony of
the situation. Disappointingly, none was
present.

Many of the original quotations in this article
contain abbreviations and acronyms which have
been spelled- outfor this article.
The Editor

NOTES
1.

Swinton died later in an accident in Germany. Toronto
Daily Star, 24 October 1966, p.92. The ItalianYugoslav film Gott mit Uns (released in Canada on 24
January 1974 as The Firing Squad) provides a
dramatized and somewhat inaccurate portrayal of
events. This movie, directed by Giuliano Montaldi. is
available on video under the title The Fifth Day of
Peace. Directorate of History, Department of National
Defence (DHist) 112.3Hl.003 (D31), Film Review:
"The Firing Squad" by Philip Chaplin, 28 January
1974. Gott mit Uns debuted at the Cannes Film
Festival between 2-16 May 1970. InApril1970, the
Canadian government considered suppressing the

Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World
War. Oxford University Press, 1977, p.216. Jeffery
Williams, The Long Left Flank: The Hard Fought Way
to the Reich, 1944-1945, Leo Cooper. 1988, p.281.
C.P. Stacey. TheCanadianArmy 1939-1945, Edmond

3.

4.
5.

Cloutier, King's Printer, 1948, p.269.
Erich Maschke, eds., Zur Geschichte der deutschen
Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Verlag
Ernst und Werner Gieseking, 1974, Xl/1: Hermann
Wolff. Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in britischer
Hand. s.79.
Milton Shulman, De;.feat in the West. Ballantine Books,
1968 (1947), p.379.
C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, Volume III, Offtcial
History of the Canadian Army in the Second World
War, Queen's Printer, 1960, p.608. Terry Copp and
Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route: Victory, Maple Leaf

Route. 1988, p.120. Norman Phillips and J. Nikerk,
Holland and the Canadians, Contact Publishing Co ..

6.

[n.d.], p.16.
Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of FieldMarshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.,
Collins, 1958, p.339. John North, North-West Europe
1944-5, HMSO, 1953, pp.237-239.
Richard S.
Malone, MissingfromtheRecorcL Collins, 1946, p.l23.

7.

NationalArchivesofCanada(NAC), RG24, Vol. 10799,
File 225C2.012 (D4), Directive, General Crerar to
Blaskowitz, 6 May 1945. Fred Whitcombe and Blair
Gilmour, The Pictorial History of Canada's Army
Overseas, 1939-1945, Whitcombe, Gilmour and Co ..
1947, pp.260-262.
8. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, War Diary (WD), Seaforth
Highlanders of Canada, 7 May 1945.
9. Reginald H. Roy, The Seaforth Highlanders ofCanada
1919-1965, Evergreen Press. 1969, p.439.
10. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10895, File 235Cl.Oll (D2). "The
Concentration, Disarming, and Evacuation of
Germans in Western Holland, As Seen at Divisional
Level," Interview with Lt.-Col. W.S. Murdoch, 7 June
1945. David Kaufman and Michie! Horn, A Liberation
Album:

11.

12.

13.
14.

Canadians in the Netherlands 1944-45,

McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1980, p.92.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799, File 225C2.012 (D4), I
Canadian Corps Surrender Order No. 2, Lt.-Gen.
Foulkes to Blaskowitz, 6 May 1945.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 10896, File 235Cl.013 (D4), "Report
1st Canadian Infantry Division for Week Ending 12
May 1945," Capt. T.J. Allan, 13 May 1945. Michie!
Horn, "More than Cigarettes, Sex and Chocolate: The
Canadian Army in the Netherlands, 1944-1945,"
Journal of Canadian Studies 16 (Fall-Winter 1981):
p.159.
DHist 112.3Hl.003 (D31). Extract, WD 4th
Reconnaissance Regiment (4 PLDG), 10 May 1945.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders,
11 May 1945. The Third Troop of the Fourth
Reconnaissance Regiment assisted "D" Company at
the Ford factory. DHist 112.3Hl.003 (D31), Extract,
WD, 4th Reconnaissance Regiment (4 PLDG). 11 May
1945.

109

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

17

Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 8

15. Montgomery, p.345.
16. DHist 322.009 (Dl37), "Historical Summary, Seaforth
Highlanders, Canadian Army 1939-45," 8September
1945.
17. DHist 145.2H1011 (Dl), "AspectsinfantryBattallion's
Activities in Western Holland First Weeks of"Eclipse, ""
Interview with Lt.-Col. G.E.B. Renison, 2 June 1945.
18. DHist 142.5M2011 (Dl), "Concentration and
Evacuation of Germans at Den Helder," 8 May-10
June 1945, Major J.G. Osler, 12 June 1945.
19. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10610, File 215Cl.009 (D20), DDOS
First Canadian Army Eclipse Instruction No. 10,
Brig. D.G.J. Farquhrson, 17 May 1945. Canadian
military authorities allowed German officers and
military police to retain personal weapons. DHist
142.1109 (D2). Message 071520, 1st Canadian
Infantry Division to All Units, 7 May 1945.
20. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (23). "List
and Description of Enemy War Material Dumps in
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Area," 15 May 1945.
This job was sometimes hazardous. On 20 May
1945, an accidental explosion of250 tons of German
ammunition on the island of Dutten killed seven
Canadian soldiers. DHist 142.31011 (D1). "CRA
Group in Surrender Operation, 8 May - 8 June
1945," Interview with Capt. J.M. Church.
21. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File215Cl.009 (D33). Memo.
EXFOR Rear to Administrative HQ First Canadian
Army, 9 May 1945.
22. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10963, File 260C2.009 (D32).
"Quarterly Report 1st Canadian Infantry Division 1
April/ 30 June 1945," ADMS 1st Canadian Infantry
Division, p.1 7. DHist 145.2N 1009 (D2). "1st Canadian
Army and 21st Army Group Instructions Operation
"Eclipse,"" April 1945. Alan Moorehead, Eclipse,
Hamish Hamilton. 1945, p.230.
23. NAC, RG24, Reel C-5342, Memo. Secretary of State
Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State External Affairs,
2 May 1945. James Bacque, Other Losses, Stoddart,
1989, p.28. The author does not agree with many of
Bacque's conclusions. Unfortunately, few books
deal directly with the Allied use of "Surrendered
Enemy Personnel" and "Disarmed Enemy Personnel"
labels for German prisoners of war in North-West
Europe after the Second World War.
24. Howard S. Levie, eds., Documents on Prisoners of
War, Volume 60, International Law Studies, Naval
War College Press, 1979, p.1 78. Eleanor C. Flynn.
"The Geneva Convention on Treatment of Prisoners
of War," George Washington Law Review 11(194243): p.508.
25. Canadian Red Cross Archives, Box ICRC-HistoryWWII-POW- Medical Commission, Rene-Jean
Wilhelm, "Can the Status of Prisoners of War be
Altered?" International Committee of the Red Cross,
1953, pp.5-8. R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War,
Oceana Publications, 1982, p.34.
26. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799. File 225C2.012 (D4). Memo.
Major-Gen. IC Administration 21st Army Group to
GOC C. First Canadian Army, 8 March 1945.
2 7. Peter Padfield, D6nitz: The Last FUhrer, Victor Gollancz
Ltd., 1984, p.433. Walter Ludde-Neurath, Regierung:
die Letzten Tage des DrittenReiches, Druffel-Verlag,

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

1980, s.161. Marlis G. Steinert, "The Allied Decision
to Arrest the Donitz Government," The Historical
Jouma131(1988): p.661.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 10799, File 225C2.012 (D4).
!Canadian Corps Operational Instruction No. 50, 10
May 1945.
DHist 144.131011 (D1). "Surrender May 1945, 1st
Canadian Infantry Division Signals," General Note
by Lt.-Col. B.W. Grover. DHist 142.1109 (D2). Lt.Col. B.W. Grover to HQ German 30th Corps, 13 May
1945.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, 1st Canadian Infantry
Division, Message 3706, I Canadian Corps to 1st
Canadian Infantry Division, 1000 hours, 11 May
1945.
Walter Lohmann and Hans H. Hildebrand, Die
Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945, Band II, PodzunVerlag, 1956-1964, 132, s.9.
M.I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, "Trends in
Wehrmacht Morale," Public Opinion Quarterly
10(1946), p.78. Edward A. ShilsandMorrisJanowitz,
"Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in
World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly 12(1948):
pp.312-313.
Johannes Steinhoff. Peter Pechel, and Dennis
Showalter, Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral
History, Regnery Gateway, 1989, p.254. James M.
Erdmann, Leajlet Operations in the Second World
War, Denver Instant Printing, 1969.
Otto
Hennicke,
"Auszuge
aus
der
Wehrmachtkriminal-statistik," Zeitschrift fur
Militiirgeschichte 5(1966): s.449. Because records
after this date are incomplete, the number of German
soldiers sacrificed during the "Justice Terror" in the
last months of the war is unknown. Recent German
research suggests 35,000 desertion convictions
(22,750 death sentences) during the entire war.
Manfred Messerschmidt and Fritz Wullner, Die
Wehrmachtsjustiz imDienste des Nationalsozialismus
Zerstorung
einer
Legende,
N amos

Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, s.91.
35. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10717, File 215Cl.98 (405). Lt.-Col.
H.V. Dicks, "THE GERMAN DESERTER:
A
Psychological Study," Director Army Psychological
Department Memo., 9 March 1945.
36. Clifton D. Bryant, Khaki-Collar Crime: Deviant
Behaviour in the Military Context, Collier, 1979, p.163.
37. DHist 142.1109 (D2). Receipt 1st Canadian AGRA
H.Q., 15 May 1945.
38. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, 1st Canadian Infantry
Division, 13 May 1945. An altered version of this
extract is reproduced in Tony Foster, Meeting of
Generals, Methuen, 1986, p.445.
39. L.B. Schapiro, "Repatriation of Deserters," British
Yearbook of International Law 29(1952). p.31l.
Hingorani, pp.31-32.
40. "Kriegsgerichte: Menschlich bedruckend,2bonn" Der
Spiegel38 ( 12 September 1966): s. 58-61. In February
1935, Fredegund Beck, an active member of the
German Resistance Movement, and her fiance, Dr.
Carl Richartz, had fled from the Gestapo in Berlin.
DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary
Returns, 16 June 1967.

110

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/8

18

Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur

41. A sympathetic Gestapo officer, who had served under
the elder Beck as a young policeman, prevented Elsa
Beck's shipment to Auschwitz by delaying an official
summons. DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to
Parliamentary Returns, 16 June 1967.
42. DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary
Returns, 16 June 1967.
43. Toronto Daily Star, 22 October 1966, p.9.
44. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7.
45. DHist 112.3Hl.009 (D182), "Notes on questions by
German magazine DER SPIEGEL from Military
Attache Bonn," 30 August 1966.
46. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7.
47. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders,
13 May 1945.
48. The Globe and Mail, 28 October 1966, p.29. In 1967,
an unremorseful Stein defended his actions: "Beck
would never have been a credit to Germany anyway.
Deserters only turn into criminals in civil life too."
DHist 81/669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Parliamentary
Returns, 16 June 1967.
49. Leslie C. Green, Essays on the Modern Law of War,
Transnational Publishers, 1985, p.266. "Der Kerl
gehartgehangt!" DerSpiegel28(10July 1978): s.3649. "Ein Menschenleben gilt fiir nix," Der Spiegel
43(19 October 1987): s.ll2-128. Ironically, the
German armed forces always considered itself a very
law-abiding institution. Geoffrey Best, "World War II
and the law of war," Review of International Studies
7(1981): p.73.
50. Manfred Messerschmidt, 'TheWehrmachtandVolksgemeinschaft," Journal of Contemporary History
18(1983): p.734. Manfred Messerschmidt, "German
Military Law in the Second World War," Wilhelm
Deist, eds., The German Military in the Age of Total
War, Berg, 1985, p.327.
51. Messerschmidt and Wiillner, s.90. Messerschmidt,
"German Military Law," p.325. Otto Peter Schweling,
Die deutsche Militcirjustiz in der Zeit des
Nationalsozialismus, N.G. Elwert Verlag Marburg,
1977, s.129.
52. Translation by the author. Franz W. Seidler, "Die
Fahnenflucht in der deutschen Wehrmacht wahrend
des Zweiten Weltkrieges," Militcirgeschichtliche
Mitteilungen 2(1977): s.24. Schweling, s.28.
53. Otto Hennicke, "Uber den Justizterror in der
deutschen Wehrmacht am Ende des Zweiten
Weltkrieges," Zeitschrift Fiir Militcirgeschichte4( 1965):
s. 720. Joachim Philipp, "Der Gerichtsherr in der
deutschen MiliUi.rgerichtsbarkeit bis 1945,"
Militcirgeschichte 27(1988): s.546. Heinz Hiirten,
"Im Umbruch der Normen: Dokumente iiber die
deutsche Militarjustiz nach der Kapitulation der
Wehrmacht," Militcirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen
2(1980): s.l37-l56 provides a good collection of
documents on the operation of German military
courts in Norway after the capitulation.
54. Lothar Gruchmann, "Ausgewahlte Documente zur
deutschen Marinejustiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg,"
Vierteijahrsheftefiir Zeitgeschichte 26(1978): s.469.
Seidler, s.33. "So etwas unterschreibt man nicht
einfach," DerSpeigel43(3 November 1965): s.69-79.
Anthony K. Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals,

55.

56.

57.

58.

E.P.DuttonandCo., 1949, pp.l56-159. Raederand
D6nitz, shaken by their experiences at Nuremburg
and Spandau, characteristically ignored the subject
in post-war memoirs. Erich Raeder, My Life, United
States Naval Institute, 1960. Karl Donitz, Memoirs:
Ten years and Twenty days, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1959.
Levie, Documents, p.187. A.J. Barker, "Number,
Rank and Name!" Military Review 55(1975): p.46.
Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International
Armed Conflict, Volume 59, International Law Studies,
1978, p.336ff. W.J. Fenrick, "The Prosecution ofWar
Criminals in Canada," Dalhousie Law Journal
12(1989): p.286.
Burrell M. Singer and R.J.S. Langford, Handbook of
Canadian Military Law, The Copp Clark Co. Ltd.,
1941, p.76. DHist lB. Lt.-Col. T.M. Hunter, "Report
No.9l: Some Aspects of Disciplinary Policy in the
Canadian Services, 1914-1946," l5July 1960, pp.7273.
Great Britain, Extracts from Manual of Military Law
1929: reprintedfor use in the Canadian Army, Edmond
Cloutier, King's Printer, 1943, p.58. DHist 89/446,
Brooke Claxton, Notes on Military Law and Discipline
for Canadian Soldiers, 6 November 1939. Bernard
Starkman, "Canadian Military Law: The Citizen as
Soldier," Canadian Bar Review 43(1965): p.414.
Clarence Richard Young, Notes on Elementary Military
Law for Canadian Officers, University of Toronto
Press, 1939, p.56. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10825, File
229.C1 (D4), "Discipline, Canadian-Desertion," Lt.Gen. Foulkes, 4 April 1945. DHist 81/166, Digest
Opinions and Rulings, Ottawa, 31 March 1944compiled records OfficeJudgeAdvocate-General DND
HQ. William Moore, TheThinYellowLine, Leo Cooper
Ltd., 1974, p.225. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and

Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 19391945, Queen's Printer, 1970, p.25l.
59. Toronto Daily Star, 22 October 1966, p.9.

60. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13743, WD,AQBranch 1st Canadian
Infantry Division, 15 May 1945.
61. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215.Cl009 (D33),
"Discipline Disarmed Wehrmacht (excl.PW)."
Adminstrative HQ First Canadian Army, 17 May
1945.
62. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File215.Cl.009 (D33), 21st
Army Group Administrative Instruction No.97, 17
May 1945.
63. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33),
"Standing Orders Breaches of Discipline,"
Administrative HQ First Canadian Army, 25 May
1945.
64. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215.Cl009 (D33), 21st
Army Group Administrative Instruction No.97, 17
May 1945.
65. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry
Division, Message 3873, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade
to lst Canadian Infantry Division, 1030 hours, 13
May 1945. Stein also sent a staff officer to Mace and
Bell-Irving with a formal request for rifles. BellIrving, leaving for England that morning, answered:
"No - Don't be a damn fool -The war is over! Please
convey those sentiments to your Commander." Letter,
H.P. Bell-Irving to author, 26 June 1992.

111

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

19

Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 8

66. DHist 000.9 (Dl43), "List Commanders and
Commanding Officers Canadian Army Units
Liberation of Netherlands, October 1944 to May
1945."
67. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry
Division, Message 3890, German XXX Corps to lst
Canadian Infantry Division, 1315 hours, 13 May
1945. Blaskowitz, one of Hitler's fanatic defence
generals, held a consistent dislike for deserters. On
5 March 1945, during the retreat from the Western
Allies, an unsympathetic Blaskowitz ordered death
for all stragglers: "As from midday 10 March, all
soldiers in all branches of the Wehrmacht who may
be encountered away from their units on roads or in
villages, in supply columns or among groups of
civilian refugees, or in dressing-stations when not
wounded, and who announce that they are stragglers
looking for their units, will be summarily tried and
shot." Shulman, pp.349-350.
68. DHist ll2.3Hl.009 (Dl82). "Notes on questions by
German magazine DER SPIEGEL from Military
Attache, Bonn, through DGI/FLO," 30August 1966.
69. Levie, Documents, p.l9l.
70. Leslie C. Green, International Law: A Canadian
Perspective, Carswell, 1984, pp.279-280.
The
Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal dismissed the
defence of superior orders: "A soldier is a reasoning
agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to
respond like a piece of machinery ... To plead superior
orders one must show an excusable ignorance of
their illegality." George F.G. Stanley, "Obedience To
Whom? To What?" Edgar Denton III, eds., Limits of
Loyalty, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980, p.l 0.
David Hughes-Morgan, "Disobedience to a Lawful
Military Command," MilitaryReview57(1977): p.74.
71. Toronto Daily Star, 25 October 1966, p.7. Webster
was "said to have been sick at his stomach from
having seen the execution take place." DHist 81/
669, Memo, J.H. Hollies to Brig. W.J. Lawson, 26
October 1966.
72. DHist ll2.3Hl.003 (D3l), Interview with Dennis
Pierce by Group Captain J.H. Hollies, 9 October
1966. Jay Baird, To Die for Germany: Heroes in the
NaziPantheon, Indiana University Press, 1990, p.228.
Geoffrey Best, Honour Among Men and Nations,
University ofToronto Press, 1981, p.65. In 1966, an
apologetic Pierce also justified the event: "We tried to
stop it, believe me, but there was nothing we could do
... they were soldiers- we all were." The Vancouver
Sun, 22 October 1966, pp.l-2.
73. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry
Division, Message 3943, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade
to lst Canadian Infantry Division, 2355 hours, 13
May 1945.
74. DHist l42.5M20ll (Dl), "Commander"PowisForce"
first month of "Eclipse,'"' Interview with Lt.-Col. A.
Powis, 12 June 1945. A war diary entry described
similar actions in the Eleventh Armoured Regiment
(The Ontario Regiment): "Several German deserters
showed up at 1400 hours. All deserters from the
German Army are handled by the Germans
themselves." DHist8l/669, Memo, S.F. Wise toJ.H.
Hollies, 16 November 1966.

75. NAC, RG24, Vol. 13732, WD, lst Canadian Infantry
Division, 18 May 1945. Canadian military authorities
later refrained from despatching this deserter, a
person named Urmanow, back to Germany. NAC,
RG24, Vol. 10967, File 260C3.009 (D6). Memo.,
Major J.M. Gray, 9 June 1945.
76. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10895, File 235Cl.Oll (Dl).
"Surrender Arrangements, 5 May-8 June 1945,
Divisional Point of View," Interview with Capt. D.G.E.
Molnar, 8 June 1945. Feldwebel Arthur Bessel, a
German deserter originally from the Sudetenland,
fell into the second category. DHist 142.11009 (D2),
Memo., lst Canadian AGRA, 17 May 1945.
77. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders,
22 May 1945.
78. NAC, RG24, Vol. 15258, WD, Seaforth Highlanders,
15 May 1945.
79. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D44).
"Approval Order of March," Lt. -Gen. Foulkes to
Blaskowitz. 21 May 1945.
80. Sir Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory, Hodder
and Stoughton, 1963, p.367. Stacey, Victory
Campaign, p.615.
81. NAC,RG24,Vol.l0896,File235Cl.Ol3(D4). "Report.
l st Canadian Infantry Division Week Ending 26 May
1945," Prepared by Capt. T.J. Allen, 27 May 1945.
82. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10967, File 260C3.009 (D6), Request,
XXX German Army Corps to lst Canadian Infantry
Division, Initialled by 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade,
24 May 1945. German pioneer and engineering units
performed reconstruction work and cleared minefields
in the Netherlands after the departure of the main
German body. Maschke, XII: Hermann Jung, Die
deutschen Kriegsgejangenenen im Gewahrsam
Belgiens, der Niederlande und Luxemburgs, s.l83.

83.

84.
85.
86.

87.

Gerhard von Ledebur, "Die Raumung in den
Gewassern von Nord-, West- und Osteuropa nach
1945," Marine Rundschau 67(1970): s.273-282.
NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33), 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division, Eclipse Instruction No.1,
l5May 1945. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10610, File215Cl.009
(Dl5), "lst Canadian Army- Holland, Situational
Maps- "Eclipse," May 1945.
Roy. p.442.
Horn, p.l68.
RobertRhodesJames, eds., WinstonS. Churchill: His
Complete Speeches 1897-1963, Volume VIII, Chelsea
House Publishers, 1974, p.8619.
Arthur L. Smith, Jr., Churchill's German Army:
Wartime Strategy and Cold War Politics, 1943-1947,

Volume 54, Sage Library of Social Research, Sage,
1977, p. 79. Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "Churchill et
L'Armee Allemande (1945)." Revue d'Histoire de la
deuxieme Guerre 93(January 1974): p.72.
88. Montgomery, p.359. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph
and Tragedy, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, p.574.
89. NAC, RG24, Vol. 10611, File 215Cl.009 (D33). Order,
First Canadian Army to Commander Twenty-Fifth
German Army, 4 June 1945. Although Canada
participated (perhaps unwittingly) in British
preparations, the likelihood of Canada actually going
to war with the Soviet Union, an erstwhile ally, was
very remote. During this time, Canada increasingly

112

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/8

20

Madsen: Victims of Circumstance: the Execution of German Deserters by Sur

sided with the more moderate Americans in political
and diplomatic discussions. Denis Smith. Diplomacy
of Fear:

Canada and the Cold War 1941-1948,

University of Toronto Press, 1988, p.84. Donald
Page, "Getting to Know the Russians- 1943-1948,"
Aloysius Balawyder, eds., Canada-Soviet Relations
1939-1980, Mosaic Press, 1981, p.23.
90. Arthur Lee Smith, Jr., Heimkehr aus dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg:
die Entlassung der deutschen
Kriegsgefangenen, Nummer 51, Schriftenreihe der
Vierte!jahrsheftefrlr Zeitgeschichte, Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1985, s.4l-42.
91. V.R. Berghahn, Modem Germany: Society, economy
and politics in the twentieth century, Cambridge
University Press, 1982, p.199.
92. Globe and Mail, 18 October 1966, p.7. Skeletons in
the closet haunted many personages in West German
governments. "Zwei W orter," Der Spiegel5(24 J anuar
1966): s.41-42. "Das ist es, was mich plagt," Der
Spiegel40(26 September 1966): s.38-4l. "Er hat die
Manneszuchtzersetzt," DerSpiegel11(10Aprill972):
s.49. "Idee vom Eckpfeiler," Der Spiegel32(3l Juli
1972): s.40-4l. "Letzte Lektion," Der Spiegel39(24
September 1979): s.5l-52.
93. "Kriegsgerichte: Menschlich bednlckend," Der Spiegel
38(12 September 1966): s.58-61. The Canadian
Department of National Defence knew of the incident
before the article was published. In July 1966, Der
Spiegel had requested information on the execution
from Colonel A.S.A Galloway. the Canadian Military
Attache in Bonn. DHist ll2.3H1.003 (D3l). Letter,
Col. A.S.A. Galloway to Director General of
Intelligence, Ottawa, 18 July 1966.
94. Toronto Daily Star, 24 October 1966, p.92. The Globe
and Mail, 24 October 1966, p.l2. DHist 81/669,
Memo, DND to Parliamentary Returns, 12 October
1966.
95. The Globe and Mail, 4 November 1966, p. 7. Captain
John Bewis, the senior legal officer of the Canadian
armed forces in Europe, agreed with Bower's
appraisal. The Vancouver Sun, 27 October 1966,
p.4l.
96. Interview with Professor Edward McWhinney, Simon
Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, 14
May 1992. DHist 81/669, Letter, McWhinney to
Hellyer, 23 September 1966.
97. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates,
1966, Volume VIII, lst Session, 27th Parliament, 7
October 1966, p.8510.
98. The Globe and Mail, 26 October 1966, p.lO. The
Globe and Mail, 28 October 1966, p.l. DHist 181.009
(D30), "Judge Advocate General." R.A. McDonald,
"The Legal Branch Law Firm of the Canadian Forces,"
Canadian Forces JAG Joumal2(1987): p.3.
99. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates,
1966, Volume XI, lst Session, 27th Parliament, 21
December 1966, p.11446.
International Law
Association, eds., The Canadian Yearbook of
International Law, The University of British Columbia,
1968, p.325.

100.DHist 81/669, Letter, Hellyer to McWhinney, 21
December 1966. On 8 March 1967, the German
Embassy formally requested, through a diplomatic
note to the Department ofExtemalAffairs, information
for Cologne Public Prosecutor Christoph Vonderbank.
DHist 81/669, Letter, Group Captain William M. Lee
to McWhinney, 11 July 1967. The West Germans
only interviewed one Canadian witness. On 24
November 1967, Pierce provided evidence at the
German Consulate in Vancouver. DHist 81/669,
Memo, W.J. Lawson, 21 November 1967.

Chris Madsen is a doctoral student at the
University of Victoria.

113

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

21

